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Abstract:  The future is likely to see an increase in the public-sector use of automated 
decision-making systems which employ machine learning techniques. 
However, there is no clear understanding of how English administrative law 
will apply to this kind of decision-making. This paper seeks to address this 
problem by bringing together administrative law, data protection law, and a 
technical understanding of automated decision-making systems in order to 
identify some of the questions to ask and factors to consider when reviewing 
the use of these systems. Due to the relative novelty of automated decision-
making in the public sector this kind of study has not yet been undertaken 
elsewhere. As a result, this paper provides a starting point for judges, 
lawyers, and legal academics who wish to understand how to legally assess or 
review automated decision-making systems and identifies areas where 
further research is required. 
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The use of automated decision-making (‘ADM’) systems in the public sector will become 
increasingly prevalent in future. Decisions involving these systems will need to meet 
administrative law’s standards for public-sector decision-making. However, while work has 
been undertaken on legal oversight of ADM more generally1, in other jurisdictions on public 
sector use of ADM specifically2, on how Parliament should respond to the growing use of 
ADM in the UK3, and on reframing certain principles of English administrative law to 
highlight risks and challenges in deploying ADM systems4, it remains unclear how English 
administrative law will apply to ADM for the purposes of judicially reviewing those 
decisions. As a result, the courts may be presented with cases involving ADM without a clear 
understanding of how legal standards for administrative decision-making apply. It’s 
therefore vitally important that work is undertaken to address this deficit. With that in 
mind, this paper discusses the key and relevant general grounds for judicial review in English 
administrative law alongside the technical characteristics of ADM systems so as to 
determine how legal standards can be applied to the use of ADM systems by public bodies5.  
 
In doing so, this paper does not undertake an in-depth analysis of the finer points of 
administrative law, of sector-specific statutory requirements, or of the intricacies of ADM 
systems. Rather, this paper marks a starting point in bridging the gap between the general 
legal standards for public sector decision-making and the realities of the systems which will 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., D Keats Citron and F A Pasquale ‘The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions’ (2014) 
89 Washington Law Review; R Binns ‘Data protection impact assessments: a meta-regulatory approach’ (2017) 
7 International Data Privacy Law 1; F Doshi-Velez, M Kortz, R Budish, C Bavitz, S Gershman, D O'Brien, S 
Schieber, J Waldo, D Weinberger, and A Wood ‘Accountability of AI Under the Law: The Role of Explanation’ 
(2017) Harvard Public Law Working Paper No.18-07. Available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3064761 [accessed 17/07/2018] 
2 C Coglianese and D Lehr 2017, ‘Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning 
Era’ (2017) 105 Georgetown Law Journal 
3 A Le Sueur ‘Robot Government: Automated Decision-Making and its Implications for Parliament’ in A Horne 
and A Le Sueur (eds) Parliament: Legislation and Accountability (Hart Publishing, 2016) p 183 
4 M Oswald ‘Algorithm-assisted decision-making in the public sector: framing the issues using administrative 
law rules governing discretionary power’ (2018) 376 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 2128 
5 Throughout, this paper uses the term ‘public body’, or ‘public bodies’, to refer to Ministers, public 
authorities, local authorities, health authorities, chief constables, reviewable tribunals, regulators, and any 
other decision-maker which is subject to judicial review when acting in a public law capacity. Note that the 
Data Protection Act 2018 (‘DPA 2018’) uses its own definition of ‘public body’ for the purposes of GDPR (DPA 
2018, s 7) 
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be subject to those standards. In the process, this paper demonstrates that more traditional 
areas of law can provide a basis for exercising control over the use of new technologies 
(which are often thought to be specialist in nature or to require entirely new responses). 
 
This high-level approach provides a means for beginning the study of how administrative 
law should adapt to these forms of decision-making in future. The current law should be 
understood as a basis for moving forward, rather than as a comprehensive framework which 
satisfactorily governs public sector ADM. In future, administrative law may need to develop 
new principles and standards for ADM so as to address some of the issues identified herein, 
and significant research may be required. As such, as well as applying existing legal 
standards to ADM, this paper seeks to identify directions for thinking about how 
administrative law should respond to ADM in a way that makes sense from both a legal and 
a technical point of view. 
 
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, by discussing ADM itself, including what it is, how it 
works, and why it poses problems for administrative law and judicial review. Next, by 
assessing when the use of ADM is permitted; first under data protection law (which applies 
across the public sector, with some exceptions, and restricts the use of ADM involving 
personal data), and then common law. Requirements around the information processed in 
ADM, including relating to relevance and to inferences and predictions produced by ADM 
systems, are then discussed. Finally, issues of fairness in automated decisions, including 





As this paper intends to apply legal principles to ADM, clarity about what is meant by 
‘automated decision-making’ is important. While ADM does not necessarily include machine 
learning, this paper primarily refers to decision-making by systems which involve algorithmic 
processes, including machine learning, to automate human decision-making. In popular 
discussions these are often termed ‘AI’, and may also be discussed by reference to 
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‘algorithms’ or ‘algorithmic decision-making’. There is little publicly-available information on 
where ADM systems are being or are planned to be used across government, and various 
public bodies have been reluctant to make this kind of information available6. However, 
research has found that they have been deployed for a number of purposes, including fraud 
detection, healthcare, child welfare, social services, and policing7. 
 
Machine learning is the process by which a computer system’s statistical model is 
automatically trained so that it can spot patterns and correlations in (usually large) datasets 
and infer information and make predictions based on those patterns and correlations8. This 
may involve a practice known as ‘profiling’; the processing of data about an individual in 
order to evaluate personal characteristics relating to their preferences, behaviours, health, 
economic situation, and so on. ADM systems are generally used in one of two ways. The first 
involves solely automated decision-making; that is, where a system’s decision is given effect 
without human intervention. This contrasts with processes where the system is a guide or 
one tool among several for a human decision-maker who ultimately brings their judgement 
to make the final decision themselves. 
 
Machine learning systems are trained using ‘training data’ (large datasets provided by the 
system designer). In the supervised machine learning systems commonly used for ADM, the 
designer also gives the system the desired output of its analysis of that data. In training, the 
system passes the data through its statistical model to produce a calculated output and then 
automatically adjusts the internal values (or ‘weightings’) of that model so as to move the 
model as a whole incrementally closer to producing the desired output. This process of 
adjusting weightings is repeated over hundreds, thousands, or millions of iterations until 
outputs closely match the desired value for the training data.  
 
                                                          
6 L Dencik, A Hintz, J Redden, and H Warne ‘Data Scores as Governance: Investigating uses of citizen scoring in 
public services‘ (2018), p.3. Available at https://datajusticelab.org/data-scores-as-governance [accessed 
10/02/2019] 
7 Hintz et al, above n 6 
8 For more in-depth but legally-accessible discussion of how machine learning systems operate, see D Lehr and 
P Ohm ‘Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning’ (2017) 51 U.C. Davis 
Law Review; for a deeper dive into machine learning research, see P Domingas ‘A few useful things to know 
about machine learning’ (2012) 55 Communications of the ACM 10 
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Once the statistical model has been trained (i.e. its weightings have been determined such 
that it produces the desired outputs with an acceptable error rate), it can infer information 
and make predictions based on other data. This involves inputting that data to the system 
so that it runs through the trained model which ultimately produces the calculated output; 
an inference or prediction either leading to a decision made by the system itself or upon 
which a human decision-maker can base their own decision. As this model is constructed by 
the system designer and then trained on data provided by the designer, the choices made in 
that process – including in composition of the model, selection of training data, and testing 
of the system – will have a significant influence on how the system functions and the 
outputs it produces and thus on the decision-making itself. 
 
Machine learning systems are known to have various issues relating to bias, unfairness, and 
discrimination in decisions9, as well as to transparency, explainability, and accountability in 
terms of oversight10, and to data protection, privacy, and other human rights issues11, 
among others. Much research has sought to improve the standards of ADM systems12, but 
this has often not considered legal conceptions or decision-making standards. As a result, 
the processes and metrics for fair, accountable, and transparent machine learning 
developed through this research do not always translate easily to legal frameworks. There 
therefore exist gaps in understanding between technical research and administrative law as 
well as between the law and the technical characteristics of ADM.  
 
                                                          
9 S Barocas and A D Selbst ‘Big Data's disparate impact’ (2016) 104 California Law Review; d boyd and K 
Crawford ‘Critical questions for big data: Provocations for a cultural, technological, and scholarly phenomenon’ 
(2012) 15 Information, Communication and Society 5; V Eubanks Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools 
Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor (Macmillan, 2018) 
10 J Burrell ‘How the machine ‘thinks’: Understanding opacity in machine learning algorithms’ (2016) Big Data 
& Society; J A Kroll, J Huey, S Barocas, E W Felten, J R Reidenberg, D G Robinson, and H Yu ‘Accountable 
Algorithms’ (2017) 165 University of Pennsylvania Law Review; F Pasquale The Black Box Society: The Secret 
Algorithms That Control Money and Information (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015) 
11 R van den Hoven van Genderen ‘Privacy and Data Protection in the Age of Pervasive Technologies in AI and 
Robotics’ (2017) 3 European Data Protection Law 3; Council of Europe ‘Algorithms and Human Rights: Study on 
the human rights dimensions of automated data processing techniques and possible regulatory implications’ 
(2017) Council of Europe study DGI(2017)12. Available at https://edoc.coe.int/en/internet/7589-algorithms-
and-human-rights-study-on-the-human-rights-dimensions-of-automated-data-processing-techniques-and-
possible-regulatory-implications.html [accessed 17/07/2018] 
12 Primarily in the ‘FAT-ML’ – Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in Machine Learning – research 
community; see https://www.fatml.org/ 
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Perhaps the greatest challenge relates to the transparency and accountability of machine 
learning decisions. Explaining decision-making is key to judicial review, but is not always 
easy with ADM systems in large part because machine learning models typically involve an 
impenetrable complex of calculations. This problem is often termed ‘algorithmic opacity’, of 
which three distinct forms have been identified13. The first is intentional opacity, where the 
system’s workings are concealed to protect intellectual property. The second is illiterate 
opacity, where a system is only understandable to those who can read and write computer 
code. And the third is intrinsic opacity, where a system’s complex decision-making process 
itself is difficult for any human to understand. More than one of these may combine – for 
example, a system can be intentionally opaque and it be the case that even if it wasn’t then 
it would still be illiterately or intrinsically opaque. The result of algorithmic opacity is that an 
automated system’s decision-making process may be difficult to understand or impossible 
to evaluate even for experienced systems designers and engineers, let alone non-technical 
reviewers. In many cases it will be virtually impossible to determine how or why a particular 
outcome was reached.  
 
While researchers have sought to address this problem14, they have not yet succeeded to 
the extent that solutions – where available – are likely to be useful to a legal or otherwise 
non-technical audience. Seemingly obvious approaches such as those predicated on 
revealing the internals of ADM may not produce the expected benefits15, given that, 
counter-intuitively, increased transparency over the internal workings of models seems to 
reduce people’s ability to detect even sizeable mistakes16. Significant further research is 
required to determine whether and how best to legally mandate ADM transparency in some 
                                                          
13 Burrell, above n 10 
14 R Guidotti, A Monreale, F Turini, D Pedreschi,  and F Gianotti ‘A Survey of Methods For Explaining Black Box 
Models’ (2018) arXiv preprint, arXiv:1802.01933. Available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.01933 [accessed 
17/07/2018] 
15 The benefits of transparency have their limits – see M Ananny and K Crawford ‘Seeing without knowing: 
Limitations of the transparency ideal and its application to algorithmic accountability’ (2016) new media & 
society; L Edwards and M Veale ‘Enslaving the Algorithm: From a 'Right to an Explanation' to a 'Right to Better 
Decisions?’ (2018) 16 IEEE Security & Privacy 3 
16 F Poursabzi-Sangdeh, D. G. Goldstein, J. M. Hofman, J. W. Vaughan, and H. Wallach ‘Manipulating and 
Measuring Model Interpretability’ (2018) arXiv preprint, arXiv:1802.07810. Available at 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.07810 [accessed 11/01/2019] 
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form, as well as to develop tools for exercising meaningful review17. For those lacking a 
technical understanding of these systems, their decision-making processes may for now 
remain all but incomprehensible. This poses particular problems for the law. Legal standards 
and review mechanisms which are primarily concerned with decision-making processes, 
which examine how decisions were made, cannot easily be applied to opaque, 
algorithmically-produced decisions. The question therefore arises throughout this paper of 
how courts and other bodies can assess ADM systems so as to exercise effective review. 
 
Legal responsibility for ADM 
 
While these issues with the complexity and opacity of machine learning are a serious 
problem, it should be emphasised that ADM systems do not operate autonomously, but 
under the design and direction of humans. And the law is concerned with the activities of 
natural or legal persons without directly addressing the actions of machines. Public bodies 
themselves, rather than machines, therefore remain responsible in law for any decision 
which involves ADM. This responsibility may take different forms depending on the nature 
of the unlawfulness in question: for example, a public body may have to account for 
unlawfully using ADM at all. Or, where using ADM is itself lawful, they may be responsible in 
law where some feature of a particular ADM system’s design or function means that 
decisions made by or with the assistance of that system are unlawful. The key point is that 
public bodies are responsible and accountable for the lawfulness of their decision-making 
whether involving ADM in some way or not, that public bodies are required to meet 
administrative law’s standards when using ADM just as with human decision-making, and 
that an unlawful decision made by or with the assistance of ADM should be dealt with by 
reviewers as it would had a similarly unlawful decision been taken by a human18. 
                                                          
17 The need for useful tools for those involved in operating or assessing ADM systems has been recognised 
elsewhere – see M Veale, M Van Kleek, and R Binns, ‘Fairness and Accountability Design Needs for Algorithmic 
Support in High-Stakes Public Sector Decision-Making’ (2018) Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on 
Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI'18). Available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.01029[accessed 
17/07/2018] 
18 In another common law jurisdiction, the Australian Government’s best practice principles for ADM 
emphasise that decisions made by or with the assistance of ADM must comply with administrative law 
(Australian Government ‘Automated Assistance in Administrative Decision-Making: Better Practice Guide’ 
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Given this, in applying administrative law to ADM, what this paper actually discusses is how 
the law applies to public bodies seeking to use ADM, what kind of considerations arise from 
their use of ADM, and what questions reviewers should ask to assess decision-making which 
involves ADM. Even where opacity remains a problem, the law will look to organisational 
and decision-making processes beyond the algorithm itself. Indeed, despite the relative 
novelty of ADM systems and their complexity and opacity, many legal questions are more 
concerned with these non-algorithmic processes. As such, familiar issues which arise in 
relation to human decision-making are relevant in the same or similar ways in relation to 
decisions involving machines. 
 
Given that much ADM across the public sector will involve processing personal data, it will 
at various points be necessary to consider principles, requirements, and restrictions from 
data protection law – the General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’)19 and the Data 
Protection Act 2018 (‘DPA 2018’)20. In relation to ADM involving personal data21, public 
bodies will most likely be acting as a data controller22 rather than as a data processor23. As a 
result, they will be responsible in law for ensuring compliance with the data protection 
principles24, including the obligation to be able to demonstrate compliance with those 




                                                          
19 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1 (‘GDPR’) 
20 As well as providing for clarifications, qualifications, and exemptions from GDPR where permitted, DPA 2018 
also extends GDPR to many circumstances where automated-decision making by public bodies is not otherwise 
covered by GDPR because their activities lie outside the scope of EU law (see DPA 2018, Pt 2 Ch 3; Pt 3; Pt 4) 
21 That is, any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (GDPR, art 4(1)) 
22 The natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others 
determines the purposes and means of processing (GDPR, art 4(8)). Where the purposes and means of 
processing are determined by an enactment, the data controller will be the person on whom the obligation to 
process the data is imposed by that enactment (DPA 2018, s 6(2)) – this will most likely be the public body in 
question. 
23 GDPR, art 4(8) 
24 GDPR, art 5; see also Recital 39 
25 GDPR, art 5(2) 
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Review of ADM 
 
There are several noteworthy points in relation to judicial review itself as a process for 
overseeing ADM. The first relates to how subjects of automated decisions (or their legal 
representatives) can determine whether a decision which affects them was made unlawfully 
and so bring judicial review proceedings. Where ADM involves personal data, GDPR may 
help; an array of information should be provided to those whose personal data is being 
processed26, including, in some cases, the existence of ADM and information about the logic 
involved27 (the so-called ‘right to an explanation’28). However, no similar provision exists for 
ADM not involving personal data.  
 
The three-month time limit normally imposed for issuing judicial review proceedings is also 
a problem. Due to the complexity of machine learning systems and the quantities of data 
involved in ADM, this may not be sufficient for a prospective claimant to obtain the data and 
other information needed to assess a decision, nor may it be sufficient for that assessment 
to be effectively undertaken. Without reform, the ability of those affected by automated 
decisions to access justice is at risk. Extending the time limit for judicial review applications 
in respect of ADM from three to six, nine, or even twelve months would go a significant way 
towards addressing this problem. Beginning the three-month period from the point when a 
potential claimant receives the necessary data and information may be an alternative 
solution. 
 
                                                          
26 Processing means “any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of 
personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, 
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or 
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction” (GDPR, art 4(2)) 
27 GDPR, arts 13-14 
28 The existence, extent, and usefulness of this right is much debated. See, e.g., B Goodman and S Flaxman 
‘European Union regulations on algorithmic decision-making and a 'right to an explanation'’ (2016) 2016 ICML 
Workshop on Human Interpretability in Machine Learning (WHI 2016). Available at 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.08813 [accessed 17/07/2017]; S Wachter, B Mittelstadt, and L Floridi  ‘Why a Right 
to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation’ 
(2017) 7 International Data Privacy Law 2; A D Selbst and J Powles ‘Meaningful information and the right to 
explanation’ (2017) 7 International Data Privacy Law 4; G Malgieri and G Comandé ‘Why a Right to Legibility of 
Automated Decision-Making Exists in the General Data Protection Regulation’ (2017) 7 International Data 
Privacy Law 4; L Edwards and M Veale ’Slave to the Algorithm? Why a 'Right to an Explanation' Is Probably Not 
the Remedy You Are Looking For’ (2017) 17 Duke Law & Technology Review 
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ADM also differs from human decision-making in that issues which might otherwise be 
considered appropriate for ‘policy’ judicial reviews can also be relevant to review of 
individual decisions (which may be termed ‘bureaucratic’ judicial review29). The fact that 
individual automated decisions are heavily influenced by the processes and choices around 
the system (i.e. selection of training data; design and training of models; and testing of 
systems) means that in order to properly evaluate those individual decisions in a 
‘bureaucratic’ review it may be necessary to also evaluate some of those broader processes 
and choices30. While human decision-makers may be influenced by various legal and non-
legal factors, these processes and choices will often be instrumental in determining how 
systems operate and what outcomes they produce in individual decisions, in a way that is 
without analogy in humans. These processes and choices can and should be accounted for 
where this is the case. The distinction between review of policy and review of individual 
decisions which exists for human decision-making may therefore be significantly blurred or 
eroded for ADM. Some of the grounds for review discussed herein relate more to review of 
policies than of individual decisions, and vice-versa, but, in order to exercise effective review 
of ADM, factors which would otherwise be thought to be outside the scope of a particular 
challenge may need to be considered. 
 
Finally, it is sometimes thought that computers, generally, and ADM systems, specifically, 
are inherently rational. This reflects the well-attested psychological phenomenon of 
automation bias, which means that humans are more likely to trust decisions made by 
machines than by other people and less likely to exercise meaningful review of or identify 
problems with automated decisions31. However, reviewers of ADM should not assume that 
machines necessarily make better decisions than humans, that machines make decisions 
which are free from human biases, or that reviewers do not need to exercise the same 
scrutiny of decisions made by machines as they would of decisions made by humans. ADM 
systems are engineered by humans, overseen by humans, and used for purposes 
                                                          
29 See, e.g., P Cane ‘Understanding Judical Review and its impact’ in M Hertogh and S Halliday (eds) Judicial 
Review and Bureaucratic Impact (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); M Elliott and T Thomas 
‘Tribunal Justice and Proportionate Dispute Resolution’ (2012) 71 Cambridge Law Journal 2 
30 J Singh, I Walden, J Crowcroft, and J Bacon ‘Responsibility & Machine Learning: Part of a Process’ (2016). 
Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2860048[accessed 02/08/2018] 
31 L J Skitka, K L Mosier, and M Burdick ‘Does automation bias decision-making?’ (1999) 51 International 
Journal of Human-Computer Studies 5 
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determined by humans. Training datasets are constructed by humans, and models are 
trained to within a particular error rate but not necessarily audited internally or tested 
across all possible scenarios. As a result, there may be unidentified quirks, flaws, and other 
problems in a system’s model which in certain circumstances result in faulty decisions.  
 
It is therefore quite possible for ADM systems to make decisions which by the law’s 
standards are irrational. The classic statement of irrationality is that it exists where a 
decision is “so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no 
sensible person who had applied his mind to the question could have arrived at it”32. There 
is no particular reason why a machine could not fail this test; where a decision would be 
irrational if it were made by a human, so too will it be irrational where it is made by a 
machine. Overcoming the assumption that decisions made by machines must be rational, 
while a psychological step rather than a legal one, is important. Unless reviewers accept that 
ADM systems can produce irrational results, no assessment of whether an ADM system has 
in fact produced an irrational result can take place. In reviewing ADM systems, it will 
therefore be important to hold them to the same standards as humans, lest imperfect 




Lawfulness of using ADM 
 
In applying legal standards to ADM, the first question to be addressed relates to the 
circumstances in which it can lawfully be used. Most straightforwardly, decisions will be 
ultra vires in its simplest form when the decision-maker has done something for which they 
lack legal authority33; where this is the case, they will have acted unlawfully whether the 
decision was taken by automated means or not. Beyond this, there are several further 
issues to explore in determining whether the law permits a decision to be made by or with 
the assistance of an ADM system. 
                                                          
32 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935; see also Associated 
Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] 2 All ER 680 
33 See, e.g., R v Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham [1997] 2 All ER 779 
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The first restrictions on the use of ADM to be considered will be those provided by data 
protection law, which arise in any situation where personal data is processed in ADM and 
are therefore general statutory restrictions applicable to many, if not most, areas of public 
administration34. The analysis will subsequently turn to common law questions relevant 
across the public sector: when using ADM would constitute unlawful sub-delegation by a 
nominated decision-maker; when using ADM would result in unlawfully fettering discretion; 
when ADM would be used for improper purposes; when the need to give reasons for a 
decision precludes the use of ADM; and when the use of contracted-out ADM would be 
unlawful. Some of these common law principles are supplemented by additional 
requirements from data protection law where personal data is processed, which will be 
discussed where relevant. 
 
Use of ADM involving personal data 
 
Under Article 22 GDPR, solely ADM, including profiling, which produces legal or similarly 
significant effects for the data subject35 is prohibited unless done on one of three available 
grounds36. Where without a valid legal basis a public body has either made an Article 22 
automated decision or has otherwise processed personal data then they have acted 
unlawfully. Determining whether ADM is caught by Article 22’s prohibition will involve 
answering two questions: whether the decision is ‘solely’ automated, and whether it would 
produce legal or ‘similarly significant’ effects on the data subject. 
 
A decision will clearly be solely automated where the result of ADM is applied directly. But 
where an automated decision is simply given effect by a human without review or 
evaluation and without considering other factors then that decision is in fact also solely 
                                                          
34 Note that DPA 2018 makes specific provision for law enforcement (Pt 3), intelligence services (Pt 4), and 
other processing which would normally be outside the scope of GDPR (Pt 2 Ch 3) 
35 A natural person who can be identified, directly or indirectly, from personal data (GDPR, art 4(1)) 
36 GDPR, art 22; Recital 71; see also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party ‘Guidelines on Automated 
individual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679’ (2018a) 17/EN 
WP251rev.01, p.19. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-
detail.cfm?item_id=612053[accessed 17/07/2018] 
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automated37. To escape Article 22, it is not enough for a human intervener to undertake a 
cursory or superficial analysis or to simply apply the decision without further consideration. 
According to the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party38, “To qualify as human 
involvement, the controller must ensure that any oversight of the decision is meaningful, 
rather than just a token gesture. It should be carried out by someone who has the authority 
and competence to change the decision. As part of the analysis, they should consider all the 
relevant data”39. The extent of human intervention should be recorded in the public body’s 
Data Protection Impact Assessment (‘DPIA’)40. 
 
The Article 22 prohibition is limited to decisions which produce legal or similarly significant 
effects concerning the data subject41. This has two aspects. The first is relatively 
straightforward: ‘legal’ effects arise where the decision in some way affects the data 
subject’s legal rights, including contractual rights42. The Working Party has interpreted this 
to include “cancellation of a contract; entitlement to or denial of a particular social benefit 
granted by law, such as child or housing benefit; [and] refused admission to a country or 
denial of citizenship”43. The second is ‘similarly significant’ effects, which could include, for 
example, the automatic refusal of credit and e-recruitment without human intervention44. 
While not giving objective criteria, the Working Party indicates that decisions akin to those 
which affect access to health services or education would also likely involve similarly 
significant effects45. Clearly, many decisions made by public bodies are likely to have ‘legal 
or similarly significant effects’ concerning the data subject. 
                                                          
37 Article 29 Data protection Working Party, above n 36, p 20 
38 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party was an EU advisory body which consisted of representatives of 
the Data Protection Authorities of each Member State, the European Data Protection Supervisor, and the 
European Commission. It provided official guidance on the interpretation and application of EU data 
protection law. It was replaced by the European Data Protection Board (which adopted the work published by 
the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party) in May 2018. 
39 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, above n 36, p 21 
40 GDPR, art 35; Recitals 84, 91-94; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, above n 36, p 21. Data controllers 
(including public bodies where ADM involves personal data) are required to undertake a Data Protection 
Impact Assessment in advance of any processing which is likely to pose a high risk to individuals, and 
particularly that which involves automated processing which produces legal or similarly significant effects 
(although note that DPA 2018 does not require necessity and proportionality assessments in DPIAs for 
processing undertaken for law enforcement purposes (s 64)) 
41 GDPR, art 22(1). 
42 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, above n 36, p 21 
43 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, above n 36, p 21 
44 GDPR Recital 71. 
45 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, above n 36, p 21 
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ADM caught by Article 22 
 
Article 22’s prohibition is subject to exemptions on three grounds. The first is where the 
ADM is necessary for the entering into or the performance of a contract between the data 
subject and the data controller46; the second is where the ADM is authorised by law (which 
must provide suitable safeguards for the data subject’s rights, freedoms, and legitimate 
interests)47; and the third is where the ADM is done on the basis of the data subject’s 
explicit consent48. If relying on the ‘authorised by law’ exemption, it is unlikely that a general 
law authorising a public body to make decisions for a specific purpose but not explicitly 
authorising ADM and not fulfilling the required conditions would qualify (note that DPA 
2018 sets out several obligations for public bodies relying on this exemption49). Article 22 
ADM is further prohibited by GDPR where it involves a subset of personal data termed 
‘special category data’50, with two exemptions51. The first exemption involves explicit 
consent under Article 9(2)(a)52. The second, for public bodies specifically, is on the basis of 
Article (9)(2)(g), which applies where processing is undertaken on the basis of law and is 
necessary for reasons of substantial public interest53. The possible bases for Article 22 ADM 
raise various issues, which will now be discussed. 
 
It is unlikely that public bodies can rely on consent-based exemptions. Consent under GDPR 
involves a “freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's 
                                                          
46 GDPR, art 22(2)(a); while public bodies are unlikely to enter into contracts with individuals who are using 
their services, they may do so in the context of employment decisions, for example. 
47 GDPR, art 22(2)(b) 
48 GDPR, art 22(2)(c) 
49 DPA 2018, s 14 
50 ‘Special category data’ is personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious 
philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, or the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the 
purposes of uniquely identifying an individual, data concerning health, or data concerning an individual’s sex 
life or sexual orientation (GDPR, art 9(1)) 
51 GDPR, art 22(4) 
52 GDPR, art 9(2)(a) 
53 GDPR, art 9(2)(g); see DPA 2018, s 10, including, in particular, s 10(3) – processing under GDPR, art 9(2)(g) 
will be lawful only where it meets a condition set out in DPA 2018, Sch 1 Pt 2. Note also that DPA, s 14 places 
certain requirements on data controllers which rely on art 9(2)(g) in making a solely automated decision which 
produces legal or similarly significant effects. 
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wishes”54. Whether consent is freely given will depend on whether the provision of a service 
was conditional upon that consent55. However, in most cases, when accessing public 
services or otherwise submitting to the decision-making of a public body, individuals will 
have no genuine choice. Indeed, as GDPR puts it: 
 
“consent should not provide a valid legal ground for the processing of 
personal data in a specific case where there is a clear imbalance between the 
data subject and the controller, in particular where the controller is a public 
authority and it is therefore unlikely that consent was freely given in all the 
circumstances of that specific situation”56 
 
Public bodies should therefore not, as a general rule, make service provision reliant on 
consent to ADM. Where they do, refusal of consent should not detrimentally affect the 
individual in question. If consent does not meet GDPR’s requirements, then there is no legal 
basis for processing. The more appropriate legal bases for Article 22 ADM in this context are 
therefore Articles 22(2)(b) (the decision is authorised by law), and, where processing special 
category data, 9(2)(g) (processing necessary for reasons of substantial public interest). 
 
Conditions apply to the exemptions allowed for in Articles 22(2)(a) (the decision is necessary 
for the performance of a contract) and 22(2)(c) (explicit consent), as well as where special 
category data is being processed. In these cases, there must exist suitable safeguards which 
protect the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of the data subject57. In addition, in 
relation to Article 9(2)(g) (processing necessary for reasons of substantial public interest), 
the legislation on which this processing is based must itself be proportionate to the aim 
pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection, and provide for suitable and 
                                                          
54 GDPR, art 4(11); see also Recital 32; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party ‘Guidelines on consent under 
Regulation 2016/679’ (2018b) 17/EN WP259 rev.01. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=623051 [accessed 17/07/2018]; 
Information Commissioner’s Office Lawful Basis for Processing: Consent (2018). Available at 
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/consent-1-
0.pdf [accessed 17/07/2018] 
55 GDPR, art 7(4); Recital 43 
56 GDPR, Recital 43 
57 GDPR, art 22(3)-(4); see also Recital 47 
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specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and interests of the data subject58. A 
general law authorising a public body to make decisions but not explicitly setting out their 
basis for using ADM would again be unlikely to suffice. If the required safeguards do not 
exist (whether for ADM involving special category data or otherwise) then the public body 
lacks a lawful basis for ADM. 
 
If, in undertaking Article 22 ADM, a public body is either processing ‘ordinary’ personal data 
under Article 22(2)(a) or is processing special category data under Article 9(2)(g), then 
determining whether it has legal authority to do so will also involve a necessity test59. The 
key question is whether there exist other effective and less intrusive methods of achieving 
the same result60 – i.e. is it necessary to employ ADM. Public bodies will need to 
demonstrate that there are no alternative or more privacy-preserving means of achieving 
the same outcome61. While each decision will stand on its own merits depending on its 
circumstances, where there are other effective means for making that decision then the 
necessity test will not be met. If a public body is relying on one of these necessity-based 
grounds but fails this test then they do not have a lawful basis for ADM. 
 
ADM not caught by Article 22 
 
For ADM which involves personal data but is not caught by Article 22, if a public body lacks a 
legal basis for the processing involved in making that decision then it again lacks the 
authority to make that decision. This would constitute a failure to comply with GDPR’s first 
data protection principle: that personal data be processed lawfully, fairly, and 
transparently62. Note that data subjects retain a right to object to processing63, except 
where this right has been restricted, qualified, or removed by DPA 201864. Where this right 
                                                          
58 GDPR, art 9(2)(g) 
59 Arising from the fact that these grounds only permit processing where it is necessary. 
60 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, above n 36, p 23 
61 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, above n 36, p 23; see also European Data Protection Supervisor 
Assessing the necessity of measures that limit the fundamental right to the protection of personal data: A 
Toolkit (2017). Available at https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/17-04-
11_necessity_toolkit_en_0.pdf [accessed 17/07/2018] 
62 GDPR, art 5(1)(a) 
63 GDPR, art 21 
64 DPA 2018, s 15 
  
- 17 - 
 
exists and has been exercised then the public body lacks a lawful basis for further 
processing. 
 
There are several grounds on which public bodies may rely for ADM not caught by Article 
22, with processing being lawful only if and to the extent that at least one ground applies65. 
The first is the data subject’s consent to the processing66. Public bodies may also undertake 
processing where necessary for entering into or the performance of a contract to which the 
data subject is party67. And public bodies may be able to process personal data where doing 
so is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the 
exercise of official authority vested in the body68. GDPR also establishes that processing 
special category data is prohibited unless a specified exemption is met. The available 
exemptions for public bodies include those which have been discussed already in relation to 
solely ADM – Article 9(2)(a) (explicit consent) and Article 9(2)(g) (processing necessary for 
reasons of substantial public interest) – as well as the exemption contained in Article 9(2)(h) 
for public bodies operating in a healthcare context69. 
 
If a public body relies on one of the consent bases then the same issues relating to valid 
consent as discussed previously will arise; it’s in many cases unlikely that this will be 
permitted. If relying on Articles 6(1)(b) (processing necessary for the performance of a 
contract), 6(1)(e) (processing necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the 
public interest), 9(2)(g) (processing necessary for reasons of substantial public interest), or 
9(2)(h) (processing necessary for various purposes related to healthcare) then the necessity 
test discussed previously in relation to Article 9(2)(g) will apply. Likewise, if relying on Article 
6(1)(e) or Article 9(2)(g) then the same test of the underlying legislation as discussed in 
relation to Article 9(2)(g) will also apply here. If the public body fails these tests where they 
apply then they lack a valid legal basis for using ADM. 
                                                          
65 GDPR, art 6(1); note that public bodies may not rely on the ‘legitimate interest’ grounds set out in in Article 
6(1)(f). 
66 GDPR, art 6(1)(a) 
67 GDPR, art 6(1)(b) 
68 GDPR, art 6(3); see DPA 2018, s 8; this ground can only be relied upon if the processing is undertaken 
pursuant to EU or domestic law which meets an objective in the public interest and is proportionate to the aim 
pursued. 
69 GDPR, art 9(2)(h); see also recital 53; DPA 2018, ss 10-11; depending on the circumstances, public bodies 
may able to process special category data where it is necessary for a variety of healthcare purposes. 
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Use of ADM by nominated decision-makers 
 
Administrative law establishes that where legislation requires that a decision be made by a 
particular person (e.g. a Minister), it shouldn’t be delegated to others as a means of 
escaping accountability70 (although where no particular individual is nominated, decisions 
may in many cases be taken by other members of the public body71). While this rule is 
primarily concerned with delegating decision-making to another person, it also has 
implications for ADM.  
 
The key question is whether it is lawful for a nominated decision-maker to make use of an 
ADM system. Courts have previously held that nominated decision-makers who take advice 
from others have not necessarily delegated their authority to them72, provided this doesn’t 
amount to the decision-maker having had the decision dictated to them73 (for example, 
where they have reserved the right to disagree with the advice74). It would therefore likely 
be the case that a decision-maker cannot rely on an ADM system to effectively make the 
decision for them, unless this is explicitly provided for in an enactment (indeed, concern 
over the legality of decisions made by computer led to provision for this being included in 
the Social Security Act 199875). The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party’s ‘token 
gesture’ test76 could be adopted as a guide here. While this was intended for determining 
whether an automated decision involving personal data is a solely automated decision, it 
also provides a useful test for decisions which do not involve personal data. Adopting this 
test would establish that the use of ADM would be lawful where a nominated decision-
maker can show that they have exercised meaningful oversight of the decision, rather than 
just a token gesture; that they have the authority and competence to change the decision; 
                                                          
70 See, e.g., Noon v Matthews [2014] EWHC 4330 (Admin); R v London Borough of Tower Hamlets ex parte 
Khalique [1994] 26 HLR 517 
71 Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560 (CA) 
72 H Lavender & Son v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1970] 1 WLR 1231 
73 Ellis v Dubowski [1921] 3 KB 621  
74 Mills v London County Council [1925] 1 KB 213 
75 Le Sueur, above n 3, pp 188-189; see Social Security Act 1998, s 2 
76 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, above n 36, p 21 
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and that they have considered all of the relevant data77. Where this test is not met, a 
nominated decision-maker would have unlawfully delegated their authority to the machine. 
 
However, automation bias is a concern. As previously discussed, people tend to trust 
decisions made by machines, are more likely to defer to machines, and are less likely to 
exercise meaningful review of decisions made by machines than if the decision was made by 
a human. The question of whether a human decision-maker who claims to have relied on an 
automated system for advice has truly exercised meaningful oversight of its decisions will 
thus be of significant importance. Where an automated decision involves personal data, the 
public body should have recorded the extent of human intervention in their DPIA. This can 
help the court assess whether any intervention was truly meaningful. However, this would 
not provide any assistance for ADM which does not involve personal data. The law may 
therefore need to develop some means of ensuring that nominated decision-makers can 
demonstrate that they have not simply given effect to an automated system’s decision 
without the appropriate level of human intervention. 
 
Use of ADM to exercise discretionary powers 
 
Where a decision-maker has a discretionary power, they should take individual 
circumstances into account when exercising it, they should make each decision on its merits 
rather than adopting a one-size-fits-all approach, and they should be prepared to depart 
from policies or guidelines where appropriate. Otherwise they may have acted illegally by 
fettering their discretion78 (although public bodies can adhere to policy as a general rule). 
This will particularly be where decisions involve human rights issues and thus necessarily 
require discretionary powers to be exercised with due consideration79. An immediate 
concern with ADM is that a decision-maker could fetter their discretion if a particular 
outcome is recommended to them or they are in some other way guided to make a 
                                                          
77 This should be reflected in the public body’s DPIA if the decision involves personal data or concerns a natural 
person. 
78 See, e.g., Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] 1 All ER 694; British Oxygen Co Ltd. V 
Minister for Technology [1971] AC 610; R v Warwickshire County Council, ex parte Collymore [1995] ELR 217; R 
(Gujra) v Crown Prosecution Service [2012] UKSC 52 
79 See, e.g, R (BBC) v Secretary of State for Justice [2012] 2012 EWHC (Admin); R (GC) v Commissioner of Police 
for the Metropolis [2011] UKSC 21 
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particular decision (as was recognised in the Australian Government’s best practice 
principles for the use of ADM systems80). Beyond this, the nature of machine learning 
systems raises further problems. 
 
Typically, machine learning systems uniformly apply a single statistical model to all 
decisions, in theory producing consistent outputs but not facilitating consideration of the 
particulars of the case at hand. In some cases this will constitute a prima facie case of 
fettering discretion. Given this, machine learning systems may be inappropriate for 
decisions where discretionary powers are likely to need to be exercised on a case-by-case 
basis, or in other situations where policy may generally be applied but where exceptions are 
likely to need to be permitted. Since many areas of public administration involve 
discretionary powers, this is a potentially significant problem for the use of ADM in those 
areas. It may be the case that their use in such circumstances is unlawful. 
 
However, administrative law is gradually evolving its view on policies, with growing 
acceptance that consistently applied policy (with appropriate exceptions where necessary to 
accommodate unusual cases) can provide benefits for good governance, consistency, and 
predictability81. The extent to which ADM systems can help promote these principles 
through consistently applying policy in circumstances where such an approach is 
appropriate is therefore a matter for further research (it’s worth noting that one stated 
reason behind providing for decision-making by computer in the Social Security Act 1998 
was that it was felt that this could assist in producing consistent decisions82). That said, 
recent developments cast doubt on whether this trend towards preferring consistently 
applied policy will continue, with equal treatment in the exercise of discretionary powers 
being cast by the Supreme Court as generally desirable but not amounting to a free-standing 
principle of administrative law in and of itself83. 
 
 
                                                          
80 Australian Government, above n 19, p viii, p 37; see also Le Sueur, above n 3, pp 196-197 
81 See, e.g., R (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12; Nzolameso v City of 
Westminster [2015] UKSC 22 
82 Le Sueur, above n 3, p.198 
83 R (Gallaher Group Ltd) v The Competition and Markets Authority [2018] UKSC 25 at [24]-[30] 
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Use of ADM for improper purposes 
 
The lawfulness of any administrative decision-making will depend on whether powers have 
been exercised for a purpose for which the public body has legal authority84. This applies 
quite straightforwardly to ADM: a public body will not be permitted to use ADM to make a 
particular decision where they lack the authority to exercise their decision-making powers 
for the purpose pursued by that decision. If they lack authority to make decisions for a 
particular purpose then they lack authority to do so regardless of whether they use ADM in 
the process or not. 
 
Again, a relevant principle from data protection law further applies this principle to ADM 
involving personal data. GDPR requires that personal data only be processed for a purpose 
compatible with that for which it was collected (a principle known as ‘purpose limitation’)85. 
As with the all of the data protection principles, public bodies as data controllers are 
responsible for complying with this principle and should be able to demonstrate 
compliance86. As a result, where public bodies otherwise have a valid legal basis to process 
personal data, they can process that data only for the purpose for which it was collected 
and for other compatible purposes. Reviewers of ADM may therefore need to determine 
whether the public body has done so. If this is not the case then the public body has no 
lawful basis for that processing. 
 
Use of ADM where reasons are required 
 
In administrative law there is no general duty to give reasons for decisions87. However, such 
a duty may be imposed by statute, and the law will usually imply a duty to give reasons in 
decisions which are judicial or quasi-judicial in nature88. For example, reasons may be 
                                                          
84 See, e.g., R v Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Padfield [1968] 1 All ER 694; R v Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte World Development Movement [1994] EWHC 1 
(Admin); and Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 
85 GDPR, art 5(1)(b); see also Recital 50 
86 GDPR, art 5(2) 
87 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody [1993] 3 WLR 154 
88 R v Civil Service Appeal Board, ex parte Cunningham [1991] 4 All ER 310 
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required in public sector employment decisions89, in relation to some powers exercised by 
professional standards and regulatory bodies90, with the refusal to issue a passport91, and so 
on. There may also be a duty to give reasons where the principle of fairness requires it, 
depending on the circumstances92. From this a general rule can be derived that the more 
serious the decision and its effects, the greater the need to give reasons for it.  
 
In many cases, the use of automated systems will be quite trivial. Whether an automated 
appointment system operated by a health clinic which deals with minor illnesses or injuries 
meets the highest standards of decision-making, for example, is, in the grand scheme of 
things and in most cases, somewhat incidental. But in other scenarios the effects may be 
rather more profound. ADM systems could potentially be used in many important areas, 
including policing and criminal justice, healthcare, taxation, welfare provision, social housing 
allocation, planning, and others. The potential use of these systems spans a whole spectrum 
of consequence, so the general rule derived from administrative law – that the more serious 
and consequential a decision the greater the need to give reasons – can be directly applied 
to ADM. 
 
In doing so, a distinction should be drawn between explanations of how a decision was 
made and reasons for why that decision was made. Explanations of how decisions were 
made would not fulfil an obligation to give reasons93. However, just as it is often not 
straightforward to explain how an ADM system reached a particular conclusion, so it is also 
not straightforward to determine why that system reached that conclusion. Where opaque 
machine learning systems are used to make decisions for which reasons will be required, or 
even as part of the process of making those decisions, their inexplicability is therefore a 
serious issue. While there is considerable research into improving the explicability of these 
systems94, this is yet to produce useful means for non-technical reviewers to understand 
                                                          
89 R v Civil Service Appeal Board, ex parte Cunningham [1991] 4 All ER 310 
90 Stefan v General Medical Council [1999] UKPC 10, [2002] All ER (D) 96 
91 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fayed [1996] EWCA Civ 946, [1998] 1 WLR 763 
92 R v Higher Education Funding Council, ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 1 All ER 651 
93 See the requirements for reasons set out in South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] 1 
WLR 1953 at [36] 
94 R Guidotti, A Monreale, F Turini, D Pedreschi, and F Gianotti, 2018, ‘A Survey of Methods For Explaining 
Black Box Models’ (2018) arXiv preprint, arXiv:1802.01933. Available at 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.01933[accessed 17/07/2018] 
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how a decision was made, much less why it was made. As in other situations where machine 
learning systems are problematic for legal review, further research is required.  
 
The courts might reasonably conclude that the present inability of ADM systems to provide 
reasons for a decision where necessary should in and of itself be a barrier to the use of 
these systems for those kinds of decisions in the first place. Some public bodies may 
attempt to circumvent this barrier by providing retrospective justifications. Courts and other 
reviewers should be aware of this risk, and should be prepared to exercise the appropriate 
level of scrutiny when it appears that public bodies are seeking to rely on such 
justifications95. Alternatively, public bodies may attempt to rely on the fact that reasons may 
not be required where giving them would be particularly difficult or onerous on the 
decision-maker96. The argument could be advanced that the opaque nature of ADM systems 
makes giving reasons onerous or difficult and thus reasons should not be required. 
However, this should be resisted as it may result in the use of ADM becoming a means of 
escaping accountability. At a minimum, where the circumstances require reasons but they 
cannot be provided, courts should be entitled to conclude that the decision was irrational 
and therefore unlawful, provided the facts and circumstances indicate that the system 
should have come to a different result97.  
 
Use of contracted-out ADM 
 
This concerns situations where a public body contracts98 with a third-party data processor to 
undertake ADM, involving personal data99 or otherwise. Where personal data is involved, 
GDPR establishes a comprehensive framework governing the relationship between data 
                                                          
95 See, e.g., R (Nash) v Chelsea College of Art and Design [2001] EWHC Admin 538 at [34]; see also Re 
Brewster’s Application [2017] UKSC 8 at [50]-[52] (although this was heard on reference from Northern 
Ireland) 
96 R v Higher Education Funding Council, ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 1 All ER 651 at [665]-[666] 
97 As they would be entitled to conclude if the decision was made by a human – see, R v Minister of Agriculture 
Fisheries and Food, ex parte Padfield [1968] 1 All ER 694 at [1053]-[1054]; R v Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry and another, ex parte Lonrho plc [1989] 2 All ER 609 at [620] 
98 For example, as permitted by Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994, Pt II or by secondary legislation 
made under that Act. 
99 For which the public body would act as a data controller. 
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controllers and data processors100. Just as public bodies generally remain responsible and 
accountable for the quality of contracted-out public services101, as data controllers they are 
responsible for compliance under GDPR even where the actual processing is undertaken by 
a third party102. But while issues around the contracts for services delivered by a third party 
have traditionally been considered to be a private law matter and thus beyond the reach of 
judicial review103, GDPR requires that controllers establish certain contractual terms with 
processors104. This potentially provides a means to extend the circumstances in which 
unlawful sub-delegation occurs to situations where public bodies have not established the 
required contractual relationship with third-party processors. 
 
While administrative law has so far been reluctant to impose public law standards on 
private organisations providing contracted-out services105, extending the remit of review to 
include contracts between public bodies and third-party data processors does not have that 
effect. Rather, it imposes a traditional public law requirement on the public body (as a data 
controller) to meet obligations set out in the applicable legislation (GDPR). Without the 
required contractual provisions, the public body has not established their relationship with 
the processor according to the requirements of the legal framework by which that 
relationship is governed. As a result, the delegation of the decision to the processor 
(through the delegation of the processing which constitutes the decision) has plainly not 
occurred lawfully. A court can therefore reasonably find that the public body in question has 
unlawfully sub-delegated to a third party. 
 
Where a decision doesn’t involve personal data, GDPR’s framework governing the 
controller-processor relationship does not apply. The result is that the traditional 
administrative law position against review of contracts with third parties applies. However, 
                                                          
100 GDPR, arts 24-36; see also Recitals 81-83; Information Commissioner’s Office ICO GDPR guidance: Contracts 
and liabilities between controllers and processors (2017). Draft. Available at https://ico.org.uk/media/about-
the-ico/consultations/2014789/draft-gdpr-contracts-guidance-v1-for-consultation-september-2017.pdf 
[accessed 17/07/2018] 
101 R Clayton ‘Accountability, Judicial Scrutiny and Contracting Out’ (2015) UK Constitutional Law Blog. 
Available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2015/11/30/richard-clayton-qc-accountability-judicial-scrutiny-
and-contracting-out [accessed 17/07/2018] 
102 GDPR, art 5(2); art 24 
103 See, e,g., R v Servite Houses and Wandsworth LBC, ex parte Goldsmith [2001] LGR 55 (QBD) 
104 GDPR, art 28; Recital 81; this is a new requirement which did not exist in previous legislation. 
105 Clayton, above n 110 
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as GDPR provides a means to extend review in relation to ADM which does involve personal 
data, perhaps it is worth considering whether the law should evolve so as to bring 
outsourced ADM which does not involve personal data within its remit. This may be 
beneficial where public bodies have not established a legal relationship through a 
contractual agreement which effectively governs their responsibilities and provides for 
appropriate oversight mechanisms of a kind comparable to those which exist in a lawful 
controller-processor relationship106.  
 
This would continue the trend of recent decades away from respecting the public/private 
divide and towards an approach to exercising oversight over privately-exercised power 
which considers the ‘nature of the function’ being exercised107. The alternative seems to be 
the emergence of two classes of outsourced ADM. The first, involving personal data, would 
be reviewable where the decision has not been delegated according to GDPR’s 
requirements. The second, not involving personal data, would not be reviewable in the 
same way. These two classes of decision-making may be equally consequential and may 
each involve a third party acting on behalf of a public body using the same kinds of systems 
raising the same kinds of accountability issues discussed throughout this paper. Yet the 
courts’ ability to exercise oversight would wholly differ on the basis of the nature of the data 
being processed. Such a situation may prove to be untenable given the likelihood of 
significantly increased public sector use of ADM in future and further research will be 
needed in order to assess the issues involved and propose a future direction for the law. 
 
 
Information considered in ADM 
 
Administrative law establishes several requirements around the information considered in 
decision-making. Decision-makers must not rely on materially-relevant facts which are 
inaccurate108. Further, decision-makers should consider all issues which are relevant to a 
                                                          
106 Arguments for other approaches in relation to other forms of outsourced public decision-making have also 
been proposed – see, e.g., C Scott ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ (2000) 27 Journal of Law and Society 
1 
107 See R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin [1987] 1 All ER 564 
108 See, e.g., Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1968] 2 WLR 163 
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decision and should not consider any issues which are not109. The data protection principle 
of ‘data minimisation’ also gives rise to a further related requirement for ADM involving 
personal data: that the processed data should be limited to what is necessary for the 
purpose being pursued. These three requirements of accuracy, relevance, and necessity can 
arise in relation to the data on which the system was trained and to the data inputted to the 
system in order to produce a decision, as well as to any inferences or predictions produced 
and considered by the system in the process of making a decision. Where public bodies fail 
to meet these requirements where applicable, they have made an error either of fact (in 
relation to accuracy) or of law (in relation to relevance and necessity) which takes them 
beyond their jurisdiction. These requirements will be explored in more detail. 
 
Training and decision data 
 
For an error of fact to be reviewable it must be materially relevant to the decision in 
question. This would occur most straightforwardly where the data used in decision-making 
is inaccurate in some way relevant to the decision. In that case, the public body has made an 
error of materially-relevant fact and has gone beyond their jurisdiction. Where the decision 
involves personal data, GDPR’s fourth data protection principle (‘accuracy’)110 will also be 
relevant. Public bodies as data controllers are responsible for ensuring the accuracy of 
personal data and should be able to demonstrate compliance111.  
 
While human decision-makers may go beyond their jurisdiction by erring in facts materially 
relevant to a decision, reviewers may need to look beyond this narrow focus with ADM. It 
may in some cases be necessary to assess the accuracy of the system’s training data, which 
will play a significant role in determining the accuracy of its statistical model and therefore 
of its inferences and predictions and thus of its decisions. However, while important where 
inaccuracies in training data may have played a role in a particular decision, this would likely 
involve reviewing a very large number of records. The practicalities of this may be 
                                                          
109 See, e.g., Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] 2 All ER 680; R v Somerset 
County Council, ex parte Fewings [1995] 1 WLR 1037; R (Venables) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [1998] AC 407 
110 GDPR, art 5(1)(d) 
111 GDPR, art 5(2) 
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challenging. While technical researchers have proposed ways of easing this to an extent112, 
there is not yet one solution which is capable of doing this and which may be of use to those 
involved in reviewing ADM. 
 
As well as this, in some cases not all of the factors used in training models and making 
decisions will be directly relevant to a given decision, yet will play a (potentially significant) 
role in determining its outcome. The relevance of these factors will therefore be an 
important consideration. There is much overlap with the ‘data minimisation’ principle for 
personal data (which holds that personal data should be adequate, relevant, and limited to 
what is necessary for the purposes for which it is processed113). ‘Adequate’ and ‘relevant’ 
map straightforwardly onto the traditional administrative law position that decision-makers 
should consider all relevant and no irrelevant factors, but ‘limited to what is necessary’ adds 
a further requirement. Public bodies would not be permitted to process personal data in 
ADM unless it is necessary to process that data in order to make the decision; i.e. unless it is 
impossible to make the decision otherwise.  
 
Problematic here is the use of ‘proxies’ where systems designers or operators do not wish to 
use personal details which are particularly sensitive or which relate to characteristics which 
are protected in some way (for example, relating to gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
and so on). Machine learning systems may instead be trained on factors which are thought 
to be a good or reliable proxy for those characteristics. This could mean that decisions are 
made on the basis of factors which are not themselves directly relevant to or necessary for 
the decision and without considering factors which are in fact relevant. If this is the case, 
then the decision may be unlawful. 
 
Two further points should also briefly be mentioned here. The law may require that 
particular consideration is given to specific factors relevant to a decision. Where an 
automated system does not do this, because its internal statistical model does not give 
those factors due weight, it has not applied the law correctly. The law may also require that 
                                                          
112 See, e.g. C E Brodley and M A Friedl ‘Identifying Mislabeled Training Data’ (1999) 11 Journal of Artificial 
Intelligence Research 
113 GDPR, art 5(1)(c) 
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where certain factors are identified a particular outcome should follow. Where the model 
does not correctly identify these factors or does not proceed to the correct outcome upon 
doing so, the system will have again erred in law. There are at present no tools which would 
assist non-technical reviewers here, so research will be required. 
 
Inferences and predictions 
 
Problems also result from the capacity of machine learning systems to infer or predict 
information from datasets, which may then be considered by the system in producing a 
decision. The accuracy and relevance of these inferences and predictions will be an 
important consideration. Even where a system can derive information with 95 percent 
accuracy, for example, that still means that at least 5 of every 100 decisions will involve 
inferred or predicted inaccuracies on which the decision may, in part, be based (indeed, a 
system which is claimed to be 95 per cent accurate may have a false positive rate of over 
one third114).  Where inferences constitute personal data, public bodies as data controllers 
are obliged to ensure that they are accurate115; where they do not constitute personal data, 
the common law position requiring the accuracy of materially relevant facts will apply. 
 
The ability of machine learning systems to infer and predict information can also cause 
problems in terms of relevance. Just as a reviewer may need to assess whether a system has 
derived and then considered inaccurate information, it may need to be determined whether 
it has derived and then considered irrelevant information. If this has occurred then the 
decision will be unlawful on traditional administrative law principles. Where derivations 
constitute personal data, GDPR’s ‘data minimisation’ principle further requires that the 
inferred or predicted information is relevant to the purpose for which the ADM is being 
undertaken116. The same principle also requires that personal data is limited to what is 
necessary for that purpose. This additional requirement of necessity provides a further 
limitation on the use of inferences and predictions in ADM, complementing the requirement 
                                                          
114 D Colquhoun ‘An investigation of the false discovery rate and the misinterpretation of p-values’ (2014) 
Royal Society Open Science. Available at 
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rsos.140216[accessed 13/01/2019] 
115 GDPR, art 5(1)(d) 
116 GDPR, art 5(1)(c) 
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of relevance found in both common law and GDPR. Public bodies are thus responsible for 
ensuring the relevance and (if personal data) necessity of information which is inferred or 
predicted and then considered in ADM. Where irrelevant or (where applicable) unnecessary 
information is predicted or inferred and then considered, a finding of illegality should result. 
 
Algorithmic opacity is again a problem for assessing the accuracy, relevance, and necessity 
of inferences and predictions. There currently exists no means for non-technical reviewers 
to readily determine whether a system has inferred or predicted and then relied upon 
inaccurate information. It is also not currently clear how those reviewing ADM could 
determine whether a system has derived and then relied upon irrelevant information. 
Requiring public bodies to disclose inferences and predictions made in the process of ADM 
may be an approach worth considering. However, this would be of limited use in facilitating 
review of inferences or predictions drawn by a system but not then represented externally 
in some way. It may be the case that future systems for public sector use should be required 
to include externalise inferences and predictions in order to facilitate disclosure. Further 
research here is required. 
 
 
Fairness in Automated Decisions 
 
Fairness is an active area of research into improving the standards of ADM. Yet while equal 
treatment and fairness (as a broader principle than procedural fairness) in the exercise of 
discretionary powers are accepted as being fundamental principles in a democratic society, 
the Supreme Court has emphasised that they do not translate to justiciable administrative 
law rights117. However, statutory prohibitions on discrimination and the common law rule 
against bias provide means by which the law seeks, in some circumstances, to promote 
equality and, to an extent, fairness (broadly conceived of) in decision-making. How these 
may apply to ADM will be considered in turn. 
 
 
                                                          
117 R (Gallaher Group Ltd) v The Competition and Markets Authority [2018] UKSC 25 at [24]-[41] 
  




The key principle of the Equality Act 2010 is non-discrimination118; both private entities and 
public bodies are under an obligation to not discriminate on grounds of a protected 
characteristic119. In law, two types of discrimination are recognised. The first is direct 
discrimination120, where a decision-maker discriminates against an individual on the basis of 
a protected characteristic. The second is indirect discrimination121, where rules which 
appear to treat everyone equally have the practical effect of excluding or placing onerous 
requirements on people who share a protected characteristic or disproportionately 
adversely affecting them when a decision is taken.  
 
Non-discrimination is a fundamental principle of lawful ADM, just as in human decision-
making. Relevant technical aspects of ADM should be explored to explain how ADM systems 
may discriminate. Machine learning systems are trained on large datasets and categorise 
people as groups of shared characteristics rather than as individuals in order to determine 
which outcome should be produced. As a result, discrimination between groups is a key 
aspect of ADM. While much research has focused on issues around bias in training datasets 
and models as well as fairness of decisions (often expressed in terms akin to actuarial 
fairness), relatively little work has been undertaken on ensuring that this discrimination is 
not on grounds of a protected characteristic122. 
 
The distinction between group-level differences and individual-level behaviour is key. Even if 
two distinguishable groups of people on the whole behave differently, this does not 
necessarily say anything about the likely behaviour of any individual member of either 
group. Indeed, it’s often impossible to predict the behaviour of any one individual from 
knowledge of the collective behaviour of a group to which they belong. Taking a 
stereotypical example, even if men on the whole tend to watch football more than women 
                                                          
118 Equality Act 2010, Pt 2 Ch 2 
119 The protected characteristics are age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, 
pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation (Equality Act 2010, ss 4-12) 
120 Equality Act 2010, s 13 
121 Equality Act 2010, s 19 
122 See, e.g., M Veale and R Binns ‘Fairer machine learning in the real world: Mitigating discrimination without 
collecting sensitive data’ (2017) Big Data & Society 
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on the whole, knowing this does not tell you anything about how much any individual man 
or woman watches football. This is a problem for ADM systems, which risk turning group-
level differences into discriminatory decisions which affect individuals. And, in law, the 
problem occurs where a decision itself is discriminatory. The historical practice of car 
insurance providers charging higher premiums for male drivers provides an analogy. The 
data on which these decisions were based may have been accurate and women as a whole 
may have presented lower risk than men as a whole. But, in charging individual men higher 
premiums than women because of their membership of the group ‘men’, those companies 
still unlawfully discriminated on grounds of a protected characteristic123.  
 
Ultimately, whether an ADM system is discriminatory is a factual question to be answered 
by reference to the decisions produced by the system in much the same way as for human 
decision-makers. The nature of the data on which the model was trained, the nature of the 
model itself, and the nature of the data on which the decision was made, while all 
potentially relevant to the question of why a decision was discriminatory (and potentially 
relevant to the question of bias, discussed below), are irrelevant in determining whether as 
a matter of law a decision was discriminatory. As such, the issues to be considered in 
identifying discrimination in automated decision do not materially differ from those which 
should be considered when identifying discrimination by humans. 
 
The rule against bias 
 
The rule against bias typically applies where a decision-maker has some interest in a case or 
where they are partial or biased against a subject of a decision in some way. While ADM 
systems have been proposed as a means for removing bias from decision-making, and while 
machines themselves do not have an interest in a given decision (as could constitute actual 
or imputed bias), research has repeatedly shown that these systems can in fact encode 
biases into decisions124.  
                                                          
123 Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others v Conseil des Ministers (C-236/09) 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:100, [2012] 1 WLR 1933 
124 See, e.g., B Friedman and H Nissenbaum ‘Bias in Computer Systems’ (1996) 14 ACM Transactions on 
Information Systems 3. Available at http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/biasincomputers.pdf 
[accessed 17/07/2018]; Barocas and Selbst, above n 9; Eubanks, above n 9 
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Bias may manifest in machine learning systems in a number of ways. For example, where 
particular groups are or historically were treated less favourably than others by public 
bodies and this is reflected in the training data, this can produce a model which repeats this 
difference in treatment. Where particular groups are or were societally disadvantaged and 
this is reflected in the training data, this can produce a model which repeats the 
disadvantage. Where the training data was not sufficiently varied for the system to have 
been trained to adequately handle all possible inputs, this can produce a model which is 
incapable of dealing with certain inputs equally to others. Or problems may arise where the 
model simply produces erroneous outputs for certain inputs due to some flaw which was 
not identified and corrected in testing. As a result, ADM systems may be prone to making 
decisions which are systematically skewed in some way, rather than acting impartially. This 
could result in those who meet particular criteria being treated less favourably than those 
who do not, and may occur in decisions which relate to both natural and legal persons. This 
could give rise to apparent bias125. 
 
The courts have previously held that in law bias can arise through “the presence of some 
factor which could prevent the bringing of an objective judgment to bear, which could 
distort … judgment”126. In ADM, this should include the presence of an internal model which 
does not produce fair and consistent outputs (for example, a system could, without any 
intention to do so on the part of the public body, treat those from certain socio-economic 
backgrounds less favourably than others). That said, while reducing bias is an active area of 
study in the machine learning research community127, there is as yet neither consensus on 
what exactly constitutes bias in ADM nor reliable means for identifying bias or eliminating it 
from training datasets, models, or automated processes128 (indeed, some research on 
reducing bias in machine learning suggests that elimination may be impossible129). Nor are 
                                                          
125 Where a protected characteristic is involved, this could potentially also constitute unlawful discrimination. 
126 Davidson v Scottish Ministers [2004] UKHL 34 at [6]; although note that his was a case heard on appeal from 
Scotland. 
127 See, e.g., R Courtland ‘Bias detectives: the researchers striving to make algorithms fair’ (2018) 558 Nature. 
Available at https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-05469-3 [accessed 17/07/2018] 
128 Courtland, above n 156 
129 See, e.g., J Kleinberg, S Mullainathan, and M Raghavan ‘Inherent Trafe-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk 
Scores’ (2016) arXiv preprint, arXiv:1609.05807. Available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.05807 [accessed 
30/07/2018]; R Berk, H Heidari, S Jabbari, M Kearns, and A Roth ‘Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: 
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there useful tools for non-technical reviewers to reliably determine whether bias exists 
either in a machine learning system’s training data or in its internal statistical model.  
 
However, bias does not need to be proven for apparent bias to arise. The usual test for 
determining whether apparent bias exists is whether there is ‘a real danger of bias’130, 
assessed from the viewpoint of a fair-minded and informed observer131 (although stricter 
tests may be applied where decision-makers have agreed to be bound by a higher 
standard132). Those reviewing automated decisions may therefore in some case need to 
determine whether a decision-making system may have encoded a bias into its model which 
has had an effect on its decisions. If a system produces decisions which consistently benefit 
or disadvantage a particular group then this possibility is likely to exist. 
 
 
Conclusions and further research 
 
ADM is likely to be increasingly prominent in the public sector in future. Yet until now there 
has been little clarity on what the law would require of public bodies in using ADM. This 
paper has sought to address this deficit by blending various administrative law grounds for 
judicial review with relevant restrictions and requirements from data protection law and an 
understanding of the technical features of these systems. In doing so, key questions and 
issues to be considered by legal reviewers have been identified and discussed. Reviewers 
should now have some clarity on when a public body has a lawful basis for using ADM. They 
should know where to begin in assessing the information considered in ADM for accuracy 
and relevance, both in terms of the training and decision data and of inferences and 
predictions produced by the system. And they should have an understanding of some things 
to consider in evaluating ADM for discrimination and bias. 
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130 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Kirkstall Valley Campaign [1996] 
131 Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) [2001]; see also Lawal v Northern Spirit [2004] 
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Along the way, this paper has highlighted the need for further research in a number of 
areas, both technical and legal. As noted at several points, two kinds of problem are likely to 
arise repeatedly in review of ADM. The first of these relates to the fact that transparency 
remains a general challenge for machine learning systems. The second relates to the more 
specific challenge of providing means for assessing ADM systems which are useful to non-
technical reviewers. While in relation to several of the issues discussed herein there exist 
academic proposals for technical solutions, these have not yet translated into widely used 
or easily accessible tools. In order for ADM systems to be used in particularly consequential 
areas of public administration there will likely need to be some accessible means for 
providing reasons for decisions. Other developments which would benefit non-technical 
reviewers of automated systems include means for evaluating the accuracy of training data, 
means for identifying inferences and predictions to be assessed for accuracy and relevance, 
and means for assessing bias in machine learning systems. 
 
From a legal point of view, research is needed around the question of sub-delegation, both 
in terms of when it’s appropriate for a nominated decision-maker to delegate to a machine 
and in terms of the extent to which the courts should exercise oversight where processing 
which does not involve personal data has been delegated to a third party. There is also 
scope for work on the extent to which machine learning systems can assist in consistently 
applying policy where appropriate. More generally, research will be required on the 
feasibility, benefits, and drawbacks of legally mandating technical transparency or adopting 
other approaches to permitting more effective review of ADM systems. 
 
In all, while adopting a high-level approach, this paper has established a basis for judges, 
lawyers, and legal academics to understand how to apply administrative law standards to 
the public-sector use of ADM systems, while also setting directions for further research. 
